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Towards responsible use of cognitive-enhancing drugs by the healthy 
Abstract 
In this article, we propose actions that will help society accept the benefits of enhancement, given 
appropriate research and evolved regulation. Prescription drugs are regulated as such not for their 
enhancing properties but primarily for considerations of safety and potential abuse. Still, cognitive 
enhancement has much to offer individuals and society, and a proper societal response will involve 
making enhancements available while managing their risks. 
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Towards responsible use of cognitive-
enhancing drugs by the healthy
Society must respond to the growing demand for cognitive enhancement. That response must start by 
rejecting the idea that ‘enhancement’ is a dirty word, argue Henry Greely and colleagues.
Today, on university campuses around the world, students are striking deals to buy and sell prescription drugs such as 
Adderall and Ritalin — not to get high, but to 
get higher grades, to provide an edge over their 
fellow students or to increase in some meas-
urable way their capacity for learning. These 
transactions are crimes in the United States, 
punishable by prison. 
Many people see such penalties as appro-
priate, and consider the use of such drugs to 
be cheating, unnatural or dangerous. Yet one 
survey1 estimated that almost 7% of students in 
US universities have used prescription stimu-
lants in this way, and that on some campuses, 
up to 25% of students had used them in the 
past year. These students are early adopters of 
a trend that is likely to grow, and indications 
suggest that they’re not alone2. 
In this article, we propose actions that will 
help society accept the benefits of enhance-
ment, given appropriate research and evolved 
regulation. Prescription drugs are regulated as 
such not for their enhancing properties but pri-
marily for considerations of safety and potential 
abuse. Still, cognitive enhancement has much 
to offer individuals and society, and a proper 
societal response will involve making enhance-
ments available while managing their risks.
Paths to enhancement 
Many of the medications used to treat psychi-
atric and neurological conditions also improve 
the performance of the healthy. The drugs most 
commonly used for cognitive enhancement at 
present are stimulants, namely Ritalin (methy-
phenidate) and Adderall (mixed amphetamine 
salts), and are prescribed mainly for the treat-
ment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD). Because of their effects on the cat-
echolamine system, these drugs increase exec-
utive functions in patients and most healthy 
normal people, improving their abilities to 
focus their attention, manipulate information 
in working memory and flexibly control their 
responses3. These drugs are widely used thera-
peutically. With rates of ADHD in the range of 
4–7% among US college students using DSM 
criteria4, and stimulant medication the stand-
ard therapy, there are plenty of these drugs on 
campus to divert to enhancement use. 
A newer drug, modafinil (Provigil), has also 
shown enhancement potential. Modafinil is 
approved for the treatment of fatigue caused by 
narcolepsy, sleep apnoea and shift-work sleep 
disorder. It is currently prescribed off label for a 
wide range of neuropsychiatric and other medi-
cal conditions involving fatigue5 as well as for 
healthy people who need to stay alert and awake 
when sleep deprived, such as physicians on night 
call6. In addition, laboratory studies have shown 
that modafinil enhances aspects of executive 
function in rested healthy adults, particularly 
inhibitory control7. Unlike Adderall and Rita-
lin, however, modafinil prescriptions are not 
common, and the drug is consequently rare on 
the college black market. But anecdotal evidence 
and a readers’ survey both suggest that adults 
sometimes obtain modafinil from their physi-
cians or online for enhancement purposes2.
A modest degree of memory enhancement 
is possible with the ADHD medications just 
mentioned as well as with medications devel-
oped for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease 
such as Aricept (donepezil), which raise levels 
of acetylcholine in the brain8. Several other 
compounds with different pharmacological 
actions are in early clinical trials, having shown 
positive effects on memory in healthy research 
subjects (see, for example, ref. 9). It is too early 
to know whether any of these new drugs will 
be proven safe and effective, but if one is it will 
surely be sought by healthy middle-aged and 
elderly people contending with normal age-
related memory decline, as well as by people 
of all ages preparing for academic or licensure 
examinations. 
Favouring innovation
Human ingenuity has given us means of enhanc-
ing our brains through inventions such as writ-
ten language, printing and the Internet. Most 
authors of this Commentary are teachers and 
strive to enhance the minds of their students, 
both by adding substantive information and by 
showing them new and better ways to process 
that information. And we are all aware of the 
abilities to enhance our brains with adequate 
exercise, nutrition and sleep. The drugs just 
reviewed, along with newer technologies such 
as brain stimulation and prosthetic brain chips, 
should be viewed in the same general category 
as education, good health habits, and informa-
tion technology — ways that our uniquely inno-
vative species tries to improve itself.
Of course, no two enhancements are equiva-
lent in every way, and some of the differences 
have moral relevance. For example, the ben-
efits of education require some effort at self-
improvement whereas the benefits of sleep do 
not. Enhancing by nutrition involves changing 
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that reading is not. The opportunity to benefit 
from Internet access is less equitably distributed 
than the opportunity to benefit from exercise. 
Cognitive-enhancing drugs require relatively 
little effort, are invasive and for the time being 
are not equitably distributed, but none of these 
provides reasonable grounds for prohibition. 
Drugs may seem distinctive among enhance-
ments in that they bring about their effects by 
altering brain function, but in reality so does any 
intervention that enhances cognition. Recent 
research has identified beneficial neural changes 
engendered by exercise10, nutrition11 and sleep12, 
as well as instruction13 and reading14. In short, 
cognitive-enhancing drugs seem morally equiv-
alent to other, more familiar, enhancements.
Many people have doubts about the moral 
status of enhancement drugs for reasons rang-
ing from the pragmatic to the philosophical, 
including concerns about short-circuiting 
personal agency and undermining the value of 
human effort15. Kass16, for example, has written 
of the subtle but, in his view, important differ-
ences between human enhancement through 
biotechnology and through more traditional 
means. Such arguments have been persuasively 
rejected (for example, ref. 17). Three arguments 
against the use of cognitive enhancement by 
the healthy quickly bubble to the surface in 
most discussions: that it is cheating, that it is 
unnatural and that it amounts to drug abuse. 
In the context of sports, pharmacological 
performance enhancement is 
indeed cheating. But, of course, 
it is cheating because it is 
against the rules. Any good set 
of rules would need to distin-
guish today’s allowed cognitive 
enhancements, from private 
tutors to double espressos, from the newer 
methods, if they are to be banned.
As for an appeal to the ‘natural’, the lives of 
almost all living humans are deeply unnatural; 
our homes, our clothes and our food — to say 
nothing of the medical care we enjoy — bear 
little relation to our species’ ‘natural’ state. 
Given the many cognitive-enhancing tools we 
accept already, from writing to laptop comput-
ers, why draw the line here and say, thus far but 
no further? 
As for enhancers’ status as drugs, drug abuse 
is a major social ill, and both medicinal and 
recreational drugs are regulated because of 
possible harms to the individual and society. 
But drugs are regulated on a scale that subjec-
tively judges the potential for harm from the 
very dangerous (heroin) to the relatively harm-
less (caffeine). Given such regulation, the mere 
fact that cognitive enhancers are drugs is no 
reason to outlaw them. 
Based on our considerations, we call for a 
presumption that mentally competent adults 
should be able to engage in cognitive enhance-
ment using drugs.
Substantive concerns and policy goals
All technologies have risks as well as benefits. 
Although we reject the arguments against 
enhancement just reviewed, we recognize at 
least three substantive ethical concerns. 
The first concern is safety. Cognitive enhance-
ments affect the most complex and important 
human organ, and the risk of unintended side 
effects is therefore both high and consequen-
tial. Although regulations governing medicinal 
drugs ensure that they are safe and effective for 
their therapeutic indications, there is no equiv-
alent vetting for unregulated ‘off label’ uses, 
including enhancement uses. Furthermore, 
acceptable safety in this context depends on 
the potential benefit. For example, a drug that 
restored good cognitive functioning to people 
with severe dementia but caused serious adverse 
medical events might be deemed safe enough to 
prescribe, but these risks would be unacceptable 
for healthy individuals seeking enhancement. 
Enhancement in children raises additional 
issues related to the long-term effects on the 
developing brain. Moreover, the possibility of 
raising cognitive abilities beyond their spe-
cies-typical upper bound may engender new 
classes of side effects. Persistence of unwanted 
recollections, for example, has clearly negative 
effects on the psyche18.
An evidence-based approach 
is required to evaluate the 
risks and benefits of cogni-
tive enhancement. At a mini-
mum, an adequate policy 
should include mechanisms 
for the assessment of both risks and benefits for 
enhancement uses of drugs and devices, with 
special attention to long-term effects on devel-
opment and to the possibility of new types of 
side effects unique to enhancement. But such 
considerations should not lead to an insist-
ence on higher thresholds than those applied to 
medications.
We call for an evidence-based approach to 
the evaluation of the risks and benefits of cog-
nitive enhancement.
The second concern is freedom, specifically 
freedom from coercion to enhance. Forcible 
medication is generally reserved for rare cases in 
which individuals are deemed threats to them-
selves or others. In contrast, cognitive enhance-
ment in the form of education is required for 
almost all children at some substantial cost to 
their liberty, and employers are generally free to 
require employees to have certain educational 
credentials or to obtain them. Should schools 
and employers be allowed to require pharma-
ceutical enhancement as well? And if we answer 
‘no’ to this question, could coercion occur indi-
rectly, by the need to compete with enhanced 
classmates and colleagues?
Questions of coercion and autonomy are 
particularly acute for military personnel and 
for children. Soldiers in the United States 
and elsewhere have long been offered stimu-
lant medications including amphetamine 
and modafinil to enhance alertness, and in 
the United States are legally required to take 
medications if ordered to for the sake of their 
military performance19. For similar reasons, 
namely the safety of the individual in question 
and others who depend on that individual in 
dangerous situations, one could imagine other 
occupations for which enhancement might be 
justifiably required. A hypothetical example is 
an extremely safe drug that enabled surgeons 
to save more patients. Would it be wrong to 
require this drug for risky operations?
Appropriate policy should prohibit coercion 
except in specific circumstances for specific 
occupations, justified by substantial gains in 
safety. It should also discourage indirect coer-
cion. Employers, schools or governments 
should not generally require the use of cog-
nitive enhancements. If particular enhance-
ments are shown to be sufficiently safe and 
effective, this position might be revisited for 
those interventions. 
Children once again represent a special case 
as they cannot make their own decisions. Com-
parisons between estimates of ADHD preva-
lence and prescription numbers have led some 
to suspect that children in certain school dis-
tricts are taking enhancing drugs at the behest 
of achievement-oriented parents, or teachers 
seeking more orderly classrooms20. Govern-
ments may be willing to let competent adults 
take certain risks for the sake of enhancement 
while restricting the ability to take such risky 
decisions on behalf of children.
The third concern is fairness. Consider an 
examination that only a certain percentage 
can pass. It would seem unfair to allow some, 
but not all, students to use cognitive enhance-
ments, akin to allowing some students taking a 
maths test to use a calculator while others must 
go without. (Mitigating such unfairness may 
raise issues of indirect coercion, as discussed 
above.) Of course, in some ways, this kind of 
unfairness already exists. Differences in edu-
cation, including private tutoring, preparatory 
courses and other enriching experiences give 
some students an advantage over others. 
Whether the cognitive enhancement is 
substantially unfair may depend on its avail-
ability, and on the nature of its effects. Does it 
actually improve learning or does it just tem-
porarily boost exam performance? In the latter 
“We should welcome 
new methods of 
improving our brain 
function.”
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case it would prevent a valid measure of the 
competency of the examinee and would 
therefore be unfair. But if it were to enhance 
long-term learning, we may be more willing 
to accept enhancement. After all, unlike ath-
letic competitions, in many cases cognitive 
enhancements are not zero-sum games. Cog-
nitive enhancement, unlike enhancement for 
sports competitions, could lead to substantive 
improvements in the world.
Fairness in cognitive enhancements has a 
dimension beyond the individual. If cognitive 
enhancements are costly, they may become the 
province of the rich, adding to the educational 
advantages they already enjoy. One could miti-
gate this inequity by giving every exam-taker 
free access to cognitive enhancements, as some 
schools provide computers during exam week 
to all students. This would help level the play-
ing field. 
Policy governing the use of cognitive 
enhancement in competitive situations should 
avoid exacerbating socioeconomic inequali-
ties, and should take into account the validity 
of enhanced test performance. In developing 
policy for this purpose, problems of enforce-
ment must also be considered. In spite of strin-
gent regulation, athletes continue to use, and be 
caught using, banned performance-enhancing 
drugs.
We call for enforceable policies concern-
ing the use of cognitive-enhancing drugs to 
support fairness, protect individuals from 
coercion and minimize enhancement-related 
socioeconomic disparities.
Maximum benefit, minimum harm
The new methods of cognitive enhance-
ment are ‘disruptive technologies’ 
that could have a profound 
effect on human life in the 
twenty-first century. A 
laissez-faire approach 
to these methods will 
leave us at the mercy 
of powerful market 
forces that are bound 
to be unleashed by the 
promise of increased 
productivity and competi-
tive advantage. The concerns 
about safety, freedom and fair-
ness, just reviewed, may well 
seem less important than the 
attractions of enhancement, 
for sellers and users alike. 
Motivated by some of the same considera-
tions, Fukuyama21 has proposed the formation 
of new laws and regulatory structures to protect 
against the harms of unrestrained biotechno-
logical enhancement. In contrast, we suggest a 
policy that is neither laissez-faire nor prima-
rily legislative. We propose to use a variety of 
scientific, professional, educational and social 
resources, in addition to legislation, to shape 
a rational, evidence-based policy informed 
by a wide array of relevant experts and stake-
holders. Specifically, we propose four types of 
policy mechanism.
The first mechanism is an accelerated 
programme of research to build a knowledge 
base concerning the usage, benefits and asso-
ciated risks of cognitive enhancements. Good 
policy is based on good information, and there 
is currently much we do not know about the 
short- and long-term benefits and risks of the 
cognitive-enhancement drugs currently being 
used, and about who is using them and why. For 
example, what are the patterns of use outside of 
the United States and outside of college commu-
nities? What are the risks of dependence when 
used for cognitive enhancement? What special 
risks arise with the enhancement of children’s 
cognition? How big are the effects of currently 
available enhancers? Do they change ‘cogni-
tive style’, as well as increasing how quickly 
and accurately we think? And given that most 
research so far has focused on simple laboratory 
tasks, how do they affect cognition in the real 
world? Do they increase the total knowledge 
and understanding that students take with 
them from a course? How do they affect various 
aspects of occupational performance?
We call for a programme of research into the 
use and impacts of cognitive-enhancing drugs 
by healthy individuals.
The second mechanism is the participa-
tion of relevant professional organizations 
in formulating guidelines for their 
members in relation to cognitive 
enhancement. Many dif-
ferent professions have a 
role in dispensing, using 
or working with peo-
ple who use cognitive 
enhancers. By creating 
policy at the level of 
professional societies, 
it will be informed by 
the expertise of these 
professionals, and their 
commitment to the goals of 
their profession.
One group to which this 
recommendation applies is 
physicians, particularly in 
primary care, paediatrics and 
psychiatry, who are most likely to be asked for 
cognitive enhancers. These physicians are some-
times asked to prescribe for enhancement by 
patients who exaggerate or fabricate symptoms 
of ADHD, but they also receive frank requests, 
as when a patient says “I know I don’t meet diag-
nostic criteria for ADHD, but I sometimes have 
trouble concentrating and staying organized, 
and it would help me to have some Ritalin on 
hand for days when I really need to be on top of 
things at work.” Physicians who view medicine 
as devoted to healing will view such prescribing 
as inappropriate, whereas those who view medi-
cine more broadly as helping patients live better 
or achieve their goals would be open to consid-
ering such a request22. There is certainly a prec-
edent for this broader view in certain branches 
of medicine, including plastic surgery, derma-
tology, sports medicine and fertility medicine.
Because physicians are the gatekeepers to 
medications discussed here, society looks to 
them for guidance on the use of these medica-
tions and devices, and guidelines from other 
professional groups will need to take into 
account the gatekeepers’ policies. For this rea-
son, the responsibilities that physicians bear for 
the consequences of their decisions are particu-
larly sensitive, being effectively decisions for all 
of us. It would therefore be helpful if physicians 
as a profession gave serious consideration to 
the ethics of appropriate prescribing of cogni-
tive enhancers, and consulted widely as to how 
to strike the balance of limits for patient benefit 
and protection in a liberal democracy. Exam-
ples of such limits in other areas of enhancement 
medicine include the psychological screening of 
candidates for cosmetic surgery or tubal ligation, 
and upper bounds on maternal age or number 
of embryos transferred in fertility treatments. 
These examples of limits may not be specified by 
law, but rather by professional standards.
Other professional groups to which this 
recommendation applies include educators 
and human-resource professionals. In differ-
ent ways, each of these professions has respon-
sibility for fostering and evaluating cognitive 
performance and for advising individuals who 
are seeking to improve their performance, and 
some responsibility also for protecting the 
interests of those in their charge. In contrast 
to physicians, these professionals have direct 
conflicts of interest that must be addressed in 
whatever guidelines they recommend: liberal 
use of cognitive enhancers would be expected 
to encourage classroom order and raise stand-
ardized measures of student achievement, both 
of which are in the interests of schools; it would 
also be expected to promote workplace produc-
tivity, which is in the interests of employers.
Educators, academic admissions officers and 
credentials evaluators are normally responsible 
for ensuring the validity and integrity of their 
examinations, and should be tasked with for-
mulating policies concerning enhancement by 
test-takers. Laws pertaining to testing accom-
modations for people with disabilities provide 
SP
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a starting point for discussion of some of the 
key issues, such as how and when enhance-
ments undermine the validity of a test result 
and the conditions under which enhancement 
should be disclosed by a test-taker.
The labour and professional organizations 
of individuals who are candidates for on-the-
job cognitive enhancement make up our final 
category of organization that should formu-
late enhancement policy. From assembly line 
workers to surgeons, many different kinds of 
employee may benefit from enhancement and 
want access to it, yet they may also need protec-
tion from the pressure to enhance.
We call for physicians, educators, regulators 
and others to collaborate in developing poli-
cies that address the use of cognitive-enhanc-
ing drugs by healthy individuals.
The third mechanism is education to 
increase public understanding of cognitive 
enhancement. This would be pro-
vided by physicians, teachers, col-
lege health centres and employers, 
similar to the way that information 
about nutrition, recreational drugs 
and other public-health informa-
tion is now disseminated. Ideally it 
would also involve discussions of different ways 
of enhancing cognition, including through 
adequate sleep, exercise and education, and an 
examination of the social values and pressures 
that make cognitive enhancement so attractive 
and even, seemingly, necessary. 
We call for information to be broadly 
disseminated concerning the risks, benefits 
and alternatives to pharmaceutical cognitive 
enhancement.
The fourth mechanism is legislative. Funda-
mentally new laws or regulatory agencies are 
not needed. Instead, existing law should be 
brought into line with emerging social norms 
and information about safety. Drug law is one 
of the most controversial areas of law, and it 
would be naive to expect rapid or revolutionary 
change in the laws governing the use of control-
led substances. Nevertheless, these laws should 
be adjusted to avoid making felons out of those 
who seek to use safe cognitive enhancements. 
And regulatory agencies should allow phar-
maceutical companies to market cognitive-
enhancing drugs to healthy adults provided 
they have supplied the necessary regulatory 
data for safety and efficacy.
We call for careful and limited legislative 
action to channel cognitive-enhancement 
technologies into useful paths.
Conclusion
Like all new technologies, cognitive enhance-
ment can be used well or poorly. We should 
welcome new methods of improving our brain 
function. In a world in which human work-
spans and lifespans are increasing, cognitive 
enhancement tools — including 
the pharmacological — will be 
increasingly useful for improved 
quality of life and extended work 
productivity, as well as to stave 
off normal and pathological age-
related cognitive declines23. Safe 
and effective cognitive enhancers will benefit 
both the individual and society.
But it would also be foolish to ignore prob-
lems that such use of drugs could create or 
exacerbate. With this, as with other technolo-
gies, we need to think and work hard to maxi-
mize its benefits and minimize its harms.  ■
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